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In this paper we revisit the literature on the economic consequences from inefficiency 
in public services provision. Following Dupuit (1844) and Pigou (1947) we argue that 
it is important to take the financing side explicitly into account. The fact that public 
expenditure financing must rely on distortional taxation implies that both direct and 
indirect costs are relevant when estimating the economic impacts of inefficiency in 
public services provision. Using Hicks’ compensating variation (following Diamond 
and McFadden (1974) and Auerbach (1985)) we show that these magnification 
mechanisms are not only conceptually relevant, they are also important from a 
quantitative point of view. Specifically, we rely on a range of estimates of public 
sector efficiency (from Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005, 2006)) to illustrate 
numerically that the relative importance of indirect costs of public sector provision 
inefficiency, linked to financing through distortional taxation increases with the 




Keywords: Government efficiency, excess burden, taxes, spending. 























  3Non-technical summary 
 
In recent years there has been much research focusing on effectiveness and efficiency 
of public sector activities (see Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005) for a brief 
overview and references). Results suggest that there is ample scope to reduce public 
spending. However, the literature also stresses that for significant efficiency gains to 
materialize it is necessary to enact deep changes in public sector management and to 
transfer activities to the private sector. 
 
The size of government, as measured by the spending-to-GDP ratio, is significantly 
higher in the euro area or in the European Union than in the US or Japan. Since public 
expenditure must be financed, taxation is also considerably higher in Europe. Prescott 
(2004) has recently emphasized that an important reason for lower levels of GDP per 
capita in Europe when compared with the US, is lower average hours worked, and not 
productivity differentials. France, for example, has higher output per hour than the 
US. Again according to Prescott the main determinant of relative labour supplies is 
differences in tax burdens. Changes in taxation also account for changes in labour 
supply over time. Thus, it is clear that the financing of public sector activities has 
allocation effects, over and above those related to the level and composition of public 
expenditures. 
 
In Public Economics the importance of the financing side of the budget has long been 
recognized. The French engineer Jules Dupuit as early as in 1844 made the classical 
contribution (see Dupuit (1844)). A century later, Arthur Pigou (1947), in his classical 
textbook on Public Finance, emphasized that, when evaluating the cost of public 
goods to the households’ sector, it is crucial to take into account the indirect cost 
associated with the excess burden of taxation. 
 
  When governments raise additional revenue, implied by inefficiency in public 
services’ provision, the required increase in tax rates is more than proportional. In 
addition, the excess burden increases with the square of the tax rate. The 
accumulation of these two effects amplifies the impact of inefficiencies in public 
services’ provision, on the economy. Using Hicks’ compensating variation (following 
Diamond and McFadden (1974) and Auerbach (1985)) we show that these 
  4magnification mechanisms are not only conceptually relevant, they are also important 
from a quantitative point of view. 
 
In this paper we present available empirical evidence on public sector efficiency and 
we discusse the implications from Dupuit’s and Pigou’s intuition for the evaluation of 
the costs associated with inefficiency in public services provision. The analysis 
concentrates exclusively on the financing side. The provision of public goods is taken 
as fixed. Increased inefficiency translates into higher taxes. Following Pigou, we 
argue that a true measure of the cost must take into account the “direct and the 
indirect damage”. We also argue that for reasonable parameter values and given 
available estimates on public sector efficiency the “indirect damage” is likely 
significant. Such indirect damage is the higher the greater the provision of public 
services and the lesser the efficiency in their provision, as illustrated numerically 
using a simple parameterised example. 
 
Specifically, we rely on a range of estimates of public sector efficiency, for Portugal 
(from Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi, 2005, 2006) to illustrate numerically that the 
relative importance indirect costs of public sector provision inefficiency, linked to 
financing through distortional taxation increases with the magnitude of the 
inefficiency.  Given our parameters, for a situation where tax revenues (including 
social security contributions) are around 37 per cent of GDP and almost 60 per cent of 
private consumption, and a use of roughly 27 per cent more resources than the 
minimum required, taking into account indirect costs of inefficiency increases the 
estimated magnitude of the loss due to distortionary taxation by about 20 per cent. 
Our results should be interpreted with care and should not be taken to be in any way 
accurate. Nevertheless, they illustrate the potential magnitude of the relevant effects.  
Thus, we conclude that taking direct and indirect costs into account is crucial for the 






  51. Introduction 
 
In recent years there has been much research focusing on effectiveness and efficiency 
of public sector activities (see Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005) for a brief 
overview and references). Results suggest that there is ample scope to reduce public 
spending. However, the literature also stresses that for significant efficiency gains to 
materialize it is necessary to enact deep changes in public sector management and to 
transfer activities to the private sector. 
 
The interest is justified, namely, by the sharp secular increase in the relative 
importance of public spending as a percentage in GDP. In the late XIX century, in 
industrialized countries, the average share of government spending, as a percentage of 
GDP, was little above 10 per cent. One hundred years later it was about 45 per cent 
(see Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) for a survey of the literature and for bibliography). 
 
Growth in the size of government raises key issues of governance and accountability. 
The Public Choice School forcefully stresses that there was no empirical basis for 
assuming that governments would always and everywhere operate in a benevolent 
way. Instead, public choice argues that public sector officials, like all economic 
agents, respond to incentives associated with the environment they operate in. 
 
The size of government, as measured by the spending-to-GDP ratio, is significantly 
higher in the euro area or in the European Union than in the US or Japan. Since public 
expenditure must be financed, taxation is also considerably higher in Europe. Prescott 
(2004) has recently emphasized that an important reason for lower levels of GDP per 
capita in Europe when compared with the US, is lower average hours worked, and not 
productivity differentials. France, for example, has higher output per hour than the 
US. Again according to Prescott the main determinant for relative labour supplies is 
differences in tax burdens. Changes in taxation also account for changes in labour 
supply over time. Therefore, it is clear that the financing of public sector activities has 
allocation effects, over and above those related to the level and composition of public 
expenditures. Thus, it is clear that it is crucial to consider financing costs when 
evaluating the economic impact of public expenditures.  
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recognized. The French engineer Jules Dupuit as early as in 1844 made the classical 
contribution (see Dupuit (1844)). A century later, Arthur Pigou (1947), in his classical 
textbook on Public Finance, emphasized that, when evaluating the cost of public 
goods to the households’ sector, it is crucial to take into account the indirect cost 
associated with the excess burden of taxation: 
 
“Where there is indirect damage, it ought to be added to the direct loss of 
satisfaction involved in the withdrawal of the marginal unit of resources by 
taxation, before this is balanced against the satisfaction yielded by the 
marginal expenditure. It follows that, in general, expenditure ought not be 
carried so far as to make the real yield of the last unit of resources expended 
by the government equal to the real yield of the last unit in the hands of the 
representative citizen.” 
 
As stated above, for the purpose of our paper the necessary ingredients were already 
present in Dupuit (1844) as “some of the general properties of taxes which it is well 
to bear in mind in questions concerning public undertakings, since the latter always 
and necessarily give rise to a tax or a toll.”(page 276).  These general properties of 
taxes are: “The heavier the tax, the less it yields relatively. The loss of utility 
increases with the square of the tax.” (page 281). 
 
The first of the two propositions refers to the Dupuit-Laffer curve. Dupuit’s 
account of it deserves quotation in full: 
 
“If a tax is gradually increased from zero up to the point where it becomes 
prohibitive, its yield is at first nil, then increases by small stages until it 
reaches a maximum, after which it gradually declines until it becomes zero 
again. It follows that when the state requires to raise a given sum by means of 
taxation, there are always two rates of tax which fulfil the requirement, one 
above and one below that which would yield the maximum. There may be a 
very great difference between the amounts of utility lost through these taxes 
which yield the same revenue.”(page 278) 
 
In our context, the first proposition means that when government requires additional 
financing required by inefficiency in public services’ provision the implied increase in 
tax rates is more than proportional to the required addition to tax revenue (even on the 
upward sloping segment of the Dupuit-Laffer curve, the relation between tax rates and 
tax revenue is concave). The second proposition simply states that the excess burden 
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inefficiencies in public services’ provision on the economy. 
 
The paper has a very limited scope. In modern societies the presence of government 
in economic life is pervasive. Institutions, laws, administrative procedures and 
enforcement practices are key in shaping opportunities and incentives open to the 
private sector. Arguably, through all these channels, inefficiency in public services 
may have far-reaching consequences throughout the economy. Clearly they are one 
important determinant of the costs of doing business in a particular location. Most of 
these are outside the scope of our paper as we concentrate on costs associated with the 
financing through taxation. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews some stylised 
fiscal facts for the EU, both in terms of spending and tax items. Section three presents 
available empirical evidence on public sector efficiency. Section four discusses the 
implications from Dupuit’s and Pigou’s intuition for the evaluation of the costs 
associated with inefficiency in public services provision. The analysis concentrates 
exclusively on the financing side. The provision of public goods is taken as fixed. 
Increased inefficiency translates into higher taxes. Following Pigou, we will argue 
that a true measure of the cost must take into account the “direct and the indirect 
damage”. This section then argues that for reasonable parameter values and given 
available estimates on public sector efficiency the “indirect damage” is likely 
significant. Such indirect damage is the higher the greater the provision of public 
services and the lesser the efficiency in their provision, as illustrated numerically. 
Section five concludes. 
 
2. Some stylised facts of government spending and revenue 
  
In this section we review some trends regarding total general government spending 
and tax revenues in the European Union, in the last four decades. This overview helps 
to illustrate notably how significant the share of government spending, as a 
percentage of GDP, has been during that period. 
 
  82.1. General government spending in the EU 
 
Over the past three decades public spending has been on an upward trend in the EU15 
countries with a significant increase in the expenditures-to-GDP ratio from 1970 until 
the beginning of the 1990s, from 35.8 per cent of GDP in 1970 to 51.3 per cent of 
GDP in 1995. Expenditure-to-GDP ratios then first decreased to 46.8 per cent in 2000 
but increased again to 48.0 per cent in 2004. For instance, the share of expenditures in 
GDP for individual countries increased from 32.6, 37.1 and 42.1 per cent respectively 
in Italy, France and Sweden in 1970, to 53.8, 49.7 and 58.5 per cent in 1990 (see 
Table 1). 
 
Table 1 – Total public expenditure as a % of GDP 
(General government) 
 
  1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004  pp  change 
2004-1970
AU  37.9 47.2 50.2 49.6 57.2 52.3 50.7 12.8 
BE  40.8 56.1 59.3 52.9 52.8 49.2 49.5  8.7 
DK  40.8 53.1 56.3 56.1 60.3 54.1 55.0 14.1 
FI  29.9 38.7 44.3 46.0 59.6 49.1 50.4 20.5 
FR  37.1 45.4 52.0 49.7 55.2 52.5 54.5 17.4 
GE  37.7 47.1 46.0 44.1 49.6 48.2 47.5  9.8 
GR  24.2 29.0 41.9 48.4 51.0 52.0 50.0 25.8 
IR  34.2 46.1 49.0 38.0 41.5 32.0 34.3  0.1 
IT  32.6 43.0 51.5 53.8 53.4 48.0 48.4 15.8 
LU  28.9 48.4 44.4    45.5 38.5 46.0 17.1 
NE  40.1 54.7 56.3 53.0 51.4 46.0 48.0  7.9 
PO  19.7 36.1 42.8 38.8 45.0 45.4 46.7 27.0 
SP  20.7 31.5 40.4 42.6 45.0 40.0 40.5 19.8 
SW  42.1 60.0 62.9 58.5 67.7 57.4 57.0 14.9 
UK  36.9 43.2 44.3 39.2 44.5 39.8 43.6  6.6 
Min  19.7 (PO)  29.0 (GR)  40.4 (SP) 38.0 (IR)  41.5 (IR)  32.0 (IR)  34.3 (IR)  0.1 (IR) 
Max  42.1 (SW)  60.0 (SW)  62.9 (SW) 58.5 (SW) 67.7 (SW) 57.4 (SW) 57.0 (SW)  27.0 (PO) 
EU12 35.1 45.0 49.2 48.2 51.6 48.2 48.5 13.4 
EU15 35.8 45.4 49.1 47.4 51.3 46.8 48.0 12.2 
US  31.7 33.1 35.7 35.5 35.0 32.5 33.8  2.1 
JP  18.5 31.2 31.4 31.1 36.9 40.9 38.6 20.1 
 
Source: AMECO Database, updated on 4 April 2005. 
 
Up to 1995 expenditures-to-GDP ratios kept on rising for most countries, reaching 
more than half of GDP for nine EU countries and going above 60 per cent of GDP for 
Sweden and Denmark. The aforementioned general trend in public expenditures is 
reflected in the overall increase of 12.2 percentage points of GDP for the EU15 
between 1970 and 2004, which ranged, on a country basis, from a virtual zero 
  9increase in Ireland to a maximum increase of 27 percentage points of GDP in 
Portugal. 
 
Nevertheless, the limitations imposed by sustainability of public finances led most EU 
countries to curb down expenditure growth from the mid-1990s onwards. Indeed, the 
expenditure-to-GDP ratio in the EU15 was reduced from 51.3 per cent in 1995 to 46.8 
per cent in 2000, halting therefore the raising trend of public expenditures in the EU. 
 
More particularly, the ratio of public expenditures-to-GDP declined between 1995 
and 2000 for all EU countries, with the exception of Greece and Portugal, where that 
ratio increased by 1.0 and 0.4 percentage points of GDP respectively. Additionally, 
France and Germany had the lowest decreases of the expenditures-to-GDP ratio 
between 1995 and 2000, respectively 2.5 and 1.4 percentage points (pp) of GDP while 
the overall reduction was 3.4 pp of GDP in the EU12 and 4.5 pp of GDP in the EU15. 
On the other hand only two countries in the EU reported an increase of the respective 
expenditure-to-GDP ratio between 1995 and 2004: Luxembourg and Portugal (see 
Table 1). 
 
The increase in total expenditures must be seen against a background where 
governments gradually tried to focus economic policy towards a better fulfilment of 
the usually defined “Musgravian” goals: macroeconomic stabilisation, income 
redistribution, and more efficient resource allocation.
1 In fact, it was during the 1970s 
and 1980s that most industrialised countries increased the coverage of social 
programmes such as unemployment insurance. On the other hand, pensions related to 
public pension programmes, even if introduced in the end of the 19
th in Germany, 
France and Italy were also reinforced in the 1970s and in the 1980s in most European 
countries. Additionally, population ageing played a major role in pushing up these 
spending items.  
 
The increase in social transfers in the EU15, during the 1970s and 1980s (some 5 pp 
of GDP between 1970and 1990 for the EU15), was generalised to every country. 
Moreover, for the period 1970-2004 significant increases were recorded in the social 
                                                 
1 These are the main government functions that were identified by Musgrave (1959). Tanzi and 
Schuknecht (2000) give a broader view of the determinants of public spending in the last decades. 
  10transfers-to-GDP ratio in Portugal (11.3 pp), Greece (10.2 pp), Finland (8.8 pp), 
Denmark and Sweden (6.9 pp), and Germany (6.6 pp).  
 
Regarding another important current expenditure category, compensation of 
employees, its share in GDP increased roughly 1.1 percentage points of GDP for the 
EU15 countries, between 1970 and 2004. Nevertheless, it is important to mention the 
existence of large differences both among countries and through time in this 
expenditure category. For instance, one can notice that the compensation of 
employees as a share of GDP in 1980 ranged from to 9.4 per cent in Greece and Spain 
to 18.0 and 20.2 per cent in Denmark and Sweden. On the other hand, in 2004 the 
lower values for those ratios were 7.6, 8.6 and 8.7 per cent respectively in Germany, 
Luxembourg and Ireland, while the higher reported values were 13.8 per cent in 
Finland, 14.7 per cent in Portugal, 16.3 per cent in Sweden and 17.8 in Denmark.  
 
In spite of the moderate general increase in the share of compensation of employees in 
GDP, in the EU15, that ratio did increase more significantly in six countries: Portugal, 
Denmark, Greece, Spain, Finland, and France. The biggest increases during that 
period occurred in Portugal, Denmark and Greece, with respectively changes of 7.5, 
4.4 and 4.3 percentage points. On the other hand, compensation of employees as a 
share of GDP decreased between 1970 and 2004 in three countries: Ireland, Germany 
and Austria, and remained at the same level in the UK.  
 
2.2. General government revenues in the EU 
 
During the last four decades tax revenues as a share of GDP increased in most 
countries of the EU, as can be seen from Table 2. For instance, this was notably the 
case of Italy, Spain, Luxembourg, and Portugal, where the aforementioned ratio 
increased by more than nine percentage points. Small decreases in the tax burdens 
were observed throughout that period in the UK and in Germany. In 2004 the tax 
burden ranged from a minimum of 22.1 per cent in Germany to 47.9 per cent in 
Denmark. Indeed, Denmark alongside with Sweden always depicted tax revenues 
consistently above 30 per cent of GDP since 1970. 
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(General government) 
 
  1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004  pp  change 
2004-1970
AU  26.8 28.7 30.6 27.1 25.8 27.8 28.0  1.2 
BE  23.8 30.1 31.1 28.8 28.9 30.4 30.3  6.5 
DK  39.9 43.0 45.5 45.3 47.3 46.9 47.9  8.1 
FI  25.8 27.3 30.7 32.6 31.0 35.1 31.7  6.0 
FR  21.4 23.0 24.5 23.6 23.8 27.7 26.7  5.3 
GE  23.5 25.4 24.6 23.0 22.5 24.6 22.1  -1.4 
GR  15.3 15.0 17.1 19.2 21.0 26.0 23.2  7.9 
IR  25.0 26.8 29.8 28.7 27.1 26.7 25.7  0.7 
IT  15.5 19.0 22.5 25.6 26.9 29.8 28.2 12.7 
LU  19.1 28.2 32.5    30.0 29.5 28.9  9.8 
NE  23.0 26.8 24.1 26.8 23.1 24.2 24.1  1.2 
PO  15.2 17.8 21.4 20.9 22.5 24.8 24.4  9.3 
SP  10.7 13.0 17.3 21.9 20.3 22.1 23.1 12.3 
SW  31.5 33.8 36.0 38.8 35.6 38.8 36.3  4.7 
UK  30.6 29.2 30.5 29.4 28.0 30.3 29.0  -1.6 
Min  10.7 (SP)  13.0 (SP)  17.1 (GR) 19.2 (GR) 20.3 (SP) 22.1 (SP) 22.1 (GE)  -1.6 (UK) 
Max  39.9 (DK)  43.0 (DK)  45.5 (DK) 45.3 (DK) 47.3 (DK) 46.9 (DK) 47.9 (DK)  12.7 (IT) 
EU12       23.9  26.5  25.3   
EU15       25.3  28.0  26.7   
US  22.4 21.2 19.7 20.2 20.7 22.6 18.3  -4.1 
JP  15.2 18.1 19.6 21.3 17.5 17.1 15.6  0.4 
 
Source: AMECO Database, updated on 4 April 2005. Total taxes include: current taxes on 
income and wealth (direct taxes), and taxes linked to imports and production (indirect taxes). 
 
Additionally, it is also possible to notice that the share of direct taxes in GDP for 
individual countries increased between 1970 and 2004 for all EU countries with the 
exception of the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden where decreases were reported 
(see Table 3). In 2004 the direct taxes-to-GDP ratio ranged from 8.9 per cent in 
















  12Table 3 – Direct and indirect taxes as a % of GDP 
(General government) 
 
  Current taxes on income and wealth 
(Direct taxes) 
Taxes linked to imports and production 
(Indirect taxes) 
 
1970 2000 2004 
pp change
2004-1970 1970 2000 2004 
pp change 
2004-1970
AU  10.7 13.2 13.1  2.4  16.1 14.6 15.0  -1.2 
BE  11.0 17.3 17.1  6.2  12.8 13.1 13.2  0.4 
DK  22.0 29.7 30.5  8.5  17.9 17.2 17.5  -0.4 
FI  12.9 21.4 17.8  4.9  12.9 13.7 13.9  1.0 
FR  6.9 12.2  11.3 4.4 14.6 15.5 15.5  0.9 
GE  10.6 12.5 10.2 -0.4 12.9 12.0 11.9  -1.0 
GR  3.1 10.8 8.9  5.8 12.2 15.2 14.3  2.1 
IR  7.8 13.5  12.5 4.7 17.2  13.2  13.2 -4.0 
IT  5.1 14.7  13.7 8.6 10.4 15.0 14.4  4.1 
LU  10.6 15.4 13.9  3.4  8.6 14.1  15.0 6.5 
NE  12.3 12.1 11.0 -1.3 10.6 12.1 13.1  2.5 
PO  5.1 10.4 9.1  4.0 10.1 14.4 15.3  5.3 
SP  3.3 10.5  10.7 7.4  7.4 11.7  12.4 4.9 
SW  19.5 22.4 19.3 -0.2 12.1 16.4 17.0  4.9 
UK  14.4 16.7 15.6  1.2  16.2 13.6 13.4  -2.8 
Min  3.1 (GR)  10.4 (PO)  8.9 (GR)  -1.3 (NE) 7.4 (SP)  11.7 (SP) 11.9 (GE)  -4.0 (IR) 
Max  22.0 (DK)  29.7 (DK)  30.5 (DK) 8.6 (IT)  17.9 (DK) 17.2 (DK) 17.5 (DK)  6.5 (LU) 
EU12   13.0  11.7    13.6  13.6  
EU15   14.3  13.0    13.7  13.7  
US  13.4 8.6 7.3 -0.8 8.9 7.3 7.2 -1.7 
JP  8.1 15.4  11.1 -2.3  7.  8.4  8.3  -1.2 
 
Source: AMECO Database, updated on 4 April 2005. Direct taxes – current taxes on income 
and wealth. Indirect taxes – taxes linked to imports and production. 
 
Moreover, the share of indirect taxes in GDP for individual countries also increased 
between 1970 and 2003 for most EU countries with the exception of five countries: 
Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland and the UK (see also Table 3). In 2004 the 
indirect taxes-to-GDP ratio ranged from 11.9% in Germany to 17.5 per cent in 
Denmark. 
 
Another relevant measure concerns the share of total taxes in total revenues. The 
developments of such ratio are illustrated in Figure 1 for the EU15 (simple average), 
Japan and the US. The average share of tax revenues in the general government total 
revenues in this period, ranged from 0.515 in France and Spain to 0.848 in Denmark. 
The comparable ratio for the EU15 averaged 0.623 in 2004, encompassing a 
minimum of 0.584 in 1995 and a maximum of 0.662 in 1970. Those developments in 
terms of the average EU15 are not very different from the ones observed in the US, 
while a clearer downward pattern for this ratio is reported for the case of Japan. 














































































































Source: AMECO database, updated on 4 April 2005. 
 
Regarding social security contributions, which are also a major source of financing 
for general government, Table 4 summarises the relevant developments for the EU15. 
It is possible to see that throughout the 1970-2004 period social security contributions 
as a share of GDP increased for all EU15 countries, as well in Japan and in the US.  
 
The development in the social security contributions-to-GDP ratio was not 
homogeneous for the EU countries in the last years. Indeed, significant rises occurred 
between 1970-2004 for the cases of Greece, Portugal, and Spain, respectively 8.6, 7.6, 
and 6.2 pp. On the other hand, more mitigated increases were seen in the cases of the 
UK, Netherlands, and Luxembourg, while this ratio is quite small in Denmark (where 
taxes-to-GDP ratios are nevertheless quite above average). If one looks at a more 
recent period, say between 1995 and 2004, similar patterns emerge regarding the 
countries where social security contributions share increased, notably Greece, 
Portugal and Sweden. However, in this case, the main reductions were reported for 
Finland, France and the Netherlands. 
 
 
  14Table 4 – Social security contributions 
(General government) 
 
  1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004  pp  change 
2004-1970
AU  10.7 14.6 14.8 15.3 17.3 16.8 16.4  5.7 
BE  12.0 14.9 17.1 16.8 16.8 16.1 16.0  4.0 
DK  2.4 1.8 2.8 2.3 2.6 3.3 2.7 0.3 
FI  5.5  10.9 11.4 12.8 14.8 12.3 12.0  6.4 
FR  13.8 19.1 20.8 20.6 20.5 18.2 18.2  4.4 
GE  12.3 16.6 17.1 16.5 18.8 18.6 18.2  5.9 
GR  7.7 9.4  11.6  11.5  12.6 14.0 16.3  8.6 
IR  2.3 4.4 5.1 5.0 6.8 5.7 6.2 3.9 
IT  11.2 12.9 13.5 14.3 14.8 12.7 12.9  1.8 
LU  8.6  13.4 12.4    12.5 11.2 12.2  3.6 
NE  13.1 17.5 19.8 16.4 17.2 17.1 15.1  2.0 
PO  5.1 7.9 8.6  10.1  11.0 11.8 12.7  7.6 
SP  7.4  12.6 12.7 12.9 13.0 13.3 13.6  6.2 
SW  8.6  14.7 13.5 14.9 13.7 15.0 14.7  6.1 
UK  5.2 6.0 6.8 6.2 7.5 7.6 8.1 2.9 
Min  2.3 (IR)  1.8 (DK)  2.8 (DK)  2.3 (DK)  2.6 (DK)  3.3 (DK)  2.7 (DK)  0.3 (DK) 
Max  13.8 (FR)  19.1 (FR)  20.8 (FR) 20.6 (FR) 20.5 (FR) 18.6 (FR) 18.2 (FR)  8.6 (GR) 
EU12       17.4  16.2  15.9   
EU15       15.7  14.3  14.3   
US  4.5 6.0 6.7 7.1 7.3 7.2 7.0 2.5 
JP  4.3 7.3 8.1 8.9 9.3 9.8  10.9 6.6 
 
Source: AMECO Database, updated on 4 April 2005. 
 
Considering the magnitude of tax revenues, including also social security 
contributions, the effort supported by the EU15 was 40.9 per cent of GDP in 2004 
(see Table 5), which compares with ratios of 25.3 per cent and 26.5 per cent 
respectively in the US and in Japan. During the period 1970-2004 one can notice 
significant increases in the share of taxes and social security contributions in GDP for 
several countries, notably in Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Italy, respectively 18.5, 
16.9, 16.4, and 14.5 pp. On the other hand, the smallest increases were recorded for 








  15Table 5 – Tax revenues including social security contributions 
(General government) 
 
  1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004  pp  change 
2004-1970
AU  37.5 43.3 45.5 42.4 43.1 44.6 44.4  6.9 
BE  35.8 45.0 48.2 45.7 45.7 46.5 46.4 10.6 
DK  42.3 44.8 48.3 47.6 49.9 50.1 50.7  8.4 
FI  31.3 38.2 42.1 45.4 45.8 47.4 43.7 12.4 
FR  35.3 42.1 45.3 44.2 44.3 45.8 45.0  9.7 
GE  35.9 42.0 41.8 39.4 41.3 43.2 40.3  4.5 
GR  23.1 24.4 28.7 30.8 33.5 40.0 39.5 16.4 
IR  27.3 31.2 35.0 33.6 34.0 32.4 31.9  4.6 
IT  26.6 32.0 36.0 39.9 41.7 42.5 41.1 14.5 
LU  27.7 41.6 44.9    42.5 40.7 41.1 13.4 
NE  36.0 44.2 44.0 43.2 40.4 41.3 39.3  3.2 
PO  20.2 25.7 30.0 31.0 33.4 36.6 37.1 16.9 
SP  18.1 25.6 30.0 34.8 33.3 35.4 36.7 18.5 
SW  40.2 48.5 49.5 53.7 49.4 53.8 51.0 10.8 
UK  35.8 35.3 37.3 35.6 35.5 37.8 37.0  1.3 
Min  18.1 (SP)  24.4 (GR)  28.7 (GR) 30.8 (GR) 33.3 (SP) 32.4 (IR)  31.9 (IR)  1.3 (UK) 
Max  42.3 (DK)  48.5 (SW)  49.5 (SW) 53.7 (SW) 49.9 (DK) 53.8 (SW) 51.0 (SW)  18.5 (SP) 
EU12       41.3  42.7  41.2   
EU15       41.0  42.3  40.9   
US  26.9 27.2 26.4 27.3 27.9 29.8 25.3  -1.6 
JP  19.5 25.3 27.7 30.1 26.7 26.9 26.5  7.0 
 
Source: AMECO Database, updated on 4 April 2005. 
 
Additionally, still another relevant stylised fact, which is worthwhile mentioning, is 
the positive and quite relevant relation that one can visually observe in Figure 2, 
between the change in the total spending-to-GDP ratio and the change in the taxes and 
social contributions-to-GDP ratio, in the last four decades. Therefore, this somehow 
points to the existence of a long-term relationship between total spending and tax 















  16Figure 2 – Changes in total spending and in taxes and social contributions-to-GDP 
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Source: Tables 1 and 5. 
 
All in all, the stylised evidence reviewed in this section cannot be overlooked as a 
reinforcement of the conclusion that, as expected, regardless of public spending being 
carried out either efficiently or inefficiently, the underlying financing relies on taxing 
the economy. Moreover, the reliance on tax revenues seems to be rather stable 
throughout the period and across the EU countries, while it is interesting to notice that 
social security contributions decreased as a ratio to GDP between 1995 and 2004, for 
the EU as a whole. 
 
3. Inefficiency in the provision of public services 
3.1. The theoretical production possibility frontier 
 
Much has been published recently on efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of 
public services. The topic is naturally important in many different ways. However, for 
the purpose of our paper, it suffices to single out a single parameter, measuring 
efficiency in public services provision. In doing so, we follow Afonso, Schuknecht 
and Tanzi (2005, 2006). On the basis of cross-country data, for 23 OECD, countries 
Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005) use a non-parametric approach to compute a 
theoretical production possibility frontier relating public sector performance with 
  17public sector spending. Their efficiency score indicator δ varies from 0 to 1. It is unity 
for combinations of spending and performance on the production possibility frontier. 
For combinations inside the frontier the efficiency score indicator is smaller than 1.  
 
Specifically, δ<1, and from an input orientation perspective, means that the country 
could provide the same amount of public services with δ per cent of the resources 
used, if it would move to the efficiency frontier. In other words, assuming that a 
country could (conceivably) provide a given amount of public sector services on the 
efficiency frontier, then δ<1 means that, in actual practice, that country is spending 
1/δ times the minimum required. That requires 1/δ times more resources. 
 
Figure 3 displays an example of a production possibility frontier with decreasing 
returns to scale for the output level Y and cost level X. For instance, countries A and C 
are efficient, with δ=1, while a country such as B is inefficient (δ<1), since it lies 
inside the frontier. Indeed, country B may be considered inefficient, in the sense that 
it performs worse than country C, because we have Y(B)<Y(C) and X(B)>X(C). 
Therefore, country C achieves a better status with less expenditure. 
 
Figure 3 – Production possibility frontier (PPF), variable returns to scale 
 
  18Still from Figure 3 we can see that (Y*, X*) is efficient in the sense that it is 
impossible to decrease the resources used while maintaining the same output level. 
On the contrary, (Y*, X(B)) is inefficient since X(B)/X*=1/δ, which is above one, that 
is, displays excess use of resources. Maintaining Y fixed at the level of Y* it is clear 
that inefficiency requires the public sector to raise (1/δ-1)X* extra revenues. In other 
words, (1/δ-1)X* is a measure of the direct cost of inefficiency in the provision of 
public services, and an actual government spends 1/δ times more than the minimum 
required. Clearly, (1/δ-1) measures, in Pigou’s terminology, the direct cost of public 
sector inefficiency. For example, Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005) estimate that, 
for instance, the input efficiency score δ is 0.79 for Portugal (see next subsection). It 
means that the country is using 26.6 per cent more resources than the minimum 
required to provide the current amount of public services.
2  
 
The question that naturally follows is: are the direct costs of inefficiency a good 
measure of the total cost imposed on the economy? Is it a good approximation? In this 
paper, following the tradition of Dupuit and Pigou, we will investigate whether 
indirect costs are relevant and by how much relevant. 
 
For the purpose of our discussion we will rely on a powerful simplifying assumption 
taking the basket of public services as invariant. For example, in Figure 3, we take 
public services output as fixed at the level Y*. Thus, we can completely avoid 
questions about what are the effects of public services on private expenditures, about 
whether public services are worthwhile and many more. Our analysis focuses 
exclusively on the financing side. In this paper, we will take into account the budget 
constraint of the public sector. In other words we will make it explicit that public 
sector expenditure must be financed by taxation.
3
 
                                                 
2 In Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2006), using a different sample of countries, the authors report an 
estimated δ of 0.385, for Portugal. Such estimate implies that the country is using 159 per cent more 
resources than the minimum necessary to provide the same bundle of public services (see Table 7 
below). 
3 It is clear that the intertemporal budget constraint implies that present and future public expenditure 
has to be financed by present or future taxation. In order to keep our analysis simple we abstract from 
the intertemporal aspects of budgetary policy. Naturally unsustainable budgetary policies would likely 
exacerbate the costs and distortions associated with the activities of the public sector. 
  19In order to address these questions it is necessary to model the household sector of the 
economy in some detail. However, a much stylised representation of the production 
side will suffice. Specifically, we follow the standard set of assumptions in the 
literature and assume that a single representative household can represent the 
consumption sector and that the economy’s production possibilities can be captured 
by a linear technology. In particular, we will assume a single production factor, 
labour, and constant returns to scale. Finally, and most importantly, we will assume 
that lump sum taxation is not institutionally feasible. Only economic transactions can 
be taxed. Work and consumption can be taxed while leisure cannot
4. 
 
We will compare a situation where the public sector has to raise R*=X* in taxes with 
a situation where the public sector is inefficient and must therefore raise R=X(B) in 
taxes, for the example in Figure 3. Therefore, we know that (R-R*)=(1/δ-1)R*. 
 
Now it is clearly true that there are many ways to raise additional resources. So it 
seems that we cannot make further progress without adding some assumption about 
the structures of taxation and how it changes in order to obtain extra revenues. One 
possibility would be to assume that the structure of taxation is optimal. Such 
assumption is workable but it seems to us, unrealistic. Thus, we assume instead that 
there is some initial structure of taxation and that the government raises additional 
revenue simply by changing the tax structure in a proportional way (in section 2.2 we 
saw from historical data for the EU that this is not too far from reality). Such 
assumption, we agree, is not only natural but allows us to simplify our problem 
tremendously. This is so because the restriction we impose on the tax structure, 
combined with our assumptions about technology, allows us to apply the composite 
commodity theorem (of Hicks (1936) and Leontief (1936)). As we will show in the 
next sub-section, under our set of assumptions the financing problem of the 
government collapses into the choice of a single tax rate. 
 
 
                                                 
4 These assumptions are discussed in Diamond and Mirrless (1971), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) and 
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980). Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) and Auerbach (1985) discuss many 
important extensions and include complete references to the relevant literature. 
  203.2. Efficient provision of public services: some evidence 
 
In this section we report on some of the available evidence in the literature regarding 
public sector efficiency in the provision of public services. From such evidence we 
can afterwards assess the plausibility of the magnitude of inefficiency to use ahead in 
the numerical simulations in section five. 
 
In order to compute a composite indicator of public sector performance for OECD 
countries, Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005) use several sub-indicators of public 
performance that take into account, for instance, administrative, education, health and 
public infrastructure outcomes. They also look at other indicators to incorporate 
information on the usually defined “Musgravian” functions of the government: 
macroeconomic stabilisation, income redistribution and efficient resource allocation. 
The so-called performance indicators are compiled from various indices that have 
each an equal weight. Based on that performance indicator as an output measure, they 
computed efficiency scores, which we reproduce in Table 6. 
 
The average input efficiency of the EU15 countries is 0.72 meaning that they should 
be able to attain the same level output using only 72 per cent of the inputs they are 
currently using. In other words, on average, the sample countries are using 38.9 per 














  21Table 6 – Public sector efficiency scores: 2000 
 
Country Input  efficiency Output  efficiency 
  Score Rank Score Rank 
Australia 0.99  4  0.92  7 
Austria 0.67  17  0.92  8 
Belgium 0.66  19  0.79  18 
Canada 0.75  12  0.84  13 
Denmark 0.62  21  0.87  11 
Finland 0.61  22  0.83  14 
France 0.64  20  0.77  20 
Germany 0.72  16  0.79  17 
Greece 0.73  14  0.65  23 
Iceland 0.87  7  0.90  10 
Ireland 0.96  5  0.93  6 
Italy 0.66  18  0.68  22 
Japan 1.00  1  1.00  1 
Luxembourg 1.00  1  1.00  1 
Netherlands 0.72  15  0.91  9 
New Zealand  0.83  9  0.81  15 
Norway 0.73  13  0.93  5 
Portugal 0.79  11  0.70  21 
Spain 0.80  10  0.78  19 
Sweden 0.57  23  0.86  12 
Switzerland 0.95  6  0.94  4 
United Kingdom  0.84  8  0.80  16 
United States  1.00  1  1.00  1 
EU15 *  0.72    0.78   
  
  Source: adapted from Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005), Free Disposable Hull scores. 
  * - Weighted averages according to the share of each country GDP in the EU15. 
 
The average output efficiency score of the EU15 implies that with given public 
expenditures, public sector performance is 78 percent (or 22 percent less) of what it 
could be if the EU15 was on the production possibility frontier (and more if the 
countries on the production possibility frontier also have scope for expenditure 
savings). 
 
Afonso, Schuknecht, and Tanzi (2006) provide another set of efficiency calculations, 
for the new EU member states and for a set of mostly emerging markets. We report 







  22Table 7 – Public sector efficiency scores: 2001/2003 
 
Input efficiency  Output efficiency  Country 
Score Rank Score Rank 
Brazil  0.381 22 0.488 22 
Bulgaria  0.461 14 0.483 23 
Chile  0.730 4 0.615  17 
Cyprus  0.489 11 0.867  3 
Czech Republic  0.439 15 0.637 13 
Estonia  0.489 12 0.632 14 
Greece  0.369 23 0.713  8 
Hungary  0.355 24 0.687  9 
Ireland  0.576 8 0.813 4 
Korea  0.749 3 0.743 6 
Latvia  0.486 13 0.624 16 
Lithuania  0.535 9 0.588  18 
Malta  0.408 19 0.753  5 
Mauritius  0.721 5 0.686  10 
Mexico  0.703 6 0.551  19 
Poland  0.412 18 0.627 15 
Portugal  0.385 21 0.678 11 
Romania  0.528 10 0.509 21 
Singapore  1.000 1 1.000 1 
Slovak  Republic  0.406 20 0.674 12 
Slovenia  0.431 16 0.731  7 
South  Africa  0.676 7 0.529  20 
Thailand  1.000 1 1.000 1 
Turkey  0.416 17 0.482 24 
Average 0.548    0.671  
 
Source: adapted from Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2006). Variable returns to scale 
efficiency scores, via Data Envelopment Analysis. 
 
Interestingly, one can notice, for instance, that countries like Greece and Portugal, 
which are present in both the results of Table 6 and 7, come out as less efficient in the 
second subset in terms of input efficiency (even if the underlying variables are not 
totally comparable). In practice, and due to the fact of differences in relative prices in 
the provision of public services, notably regarding compensation of employees, what 
one can guess is that, for such countries, the efficiency scores from Table 6 could be 
overestimated while the efficiency scores from Table 7 may be underestimated. All in 
all, and as a tentative assessment, this could provide a possible range for the input 
efficiency scores for countries present in both samples. 
 
Inspired on the analysis of Afonso, Schuknecht, and Tanzi (2005), additional the 
Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCP) of the Netherlands (2004) provides also 
results for public sector performance. This analysis includes 22 countries, and notably 
  23four new members of the EU, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, 
alongside with the EU15. In line with Afonso et al. (2005), they use 19 indicators 
divided into four main groups: stabilisation/growth, distribution, allocation and 
quality of public administration. 
 
The results reported by the SCP (2004) seem to point to the fact that there isn’t much 
relation between public performance and public spending. The best performers are 
Ireland, Finland and Luxembourg. Good performers are also Sweden, Denmark, 
Austria, and the Netherlands. Most southern European countries, notably Portugal, 
Greece and Italy, and also Hungary, show below average performance and average 
public spending. All in all, both set of results point to the existence of relevant 
inefficiencies in the provision of public services.
5  
 
In this paper, we will not take a stand on the accuracy and reliability of the available 
estimates. Instead, we will use the range of input efficiency estimates, for Portugal, 
from Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005, 2006), for the numerical examples of 
subsection 4.2. 
 
4. The simplest theoretical framework 
 
Here we review some of the theoretical underpinnings. We will explore the costs 
associated with the financing of inefficiency in public services provision through 
distortional taxation. We will use Hicks’ compensating variation (following Diamond 
and McFadden (1974) and Auerbach (1985)) to show that these magnification 
mechanisms are not only conceptually relevant, they are also important from a 
quantitative point of view. Specifically, we rely on a range of estimates of public 
sector efficiency (from Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005, 2006) to illustrate 
numerically that the relative importance of indirect costs of public sector provision 
inefficiency, linked to financing through distortional taxation, increases with the 
magnitude of the inefficiency.  
 
 
                                                 
5 Additional cross-country efficiency calculations, for the provision of public services in specific areas 
of public intervention, can be found in SCP (2004), and in Afonso and St. Aubyn (2005, 2006). 
  244.1. Direct and indirect costs of inefficiency 
 
Under our assumptions, consumer choices may be summarized (without loss of 
generality) as involving only two goods (consumption and leisure). In such a setting, 
without any external source of income, the household budget constraint is 
 
  , (1)  ) )( 1 ( ) 1 ( l T t w px t
l c − − = +
 
where t
c is the tax rate on consumption, p is the producer price of the consumption 
good (assumed fixed by perfect competition and linear technology), x is consumption, 
w the gross wage rate, t
l the tax on work, T is the time endowment (given) and, 
finally, l is leisure. 
 
Thus there is no loss of generality in writing: 
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l) and we take leisure (or work) as the numeraire (that is we 
take w=1)
6. Equation (3) may be written in compact form as  
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Such form is frequently used in the optimal taxation literature where q denotes 
consumer prices and p denotes producer prices. 
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Formulated in these terms our problem becomes very simple and can be approached 
following the methodology in Diamond and McFadden (1974) and Auerbach (1985). 
For our specific case it implies the following steps: 
 
First, we take a situation of efficiency in public services’ provision as our starting 
point. In other words we will consider a pair (Y
0, X
0) in the production possibility 
frontier in Figure 3. The necessary resources X
0 correspond exactly to the tax 
revenues collected: 
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0
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It is true that  
 
  , (6)  ) , ( ) , ) 1 ((
0 0 0 0 = = + u q e u p t e
 
where x(.) is the Marshallian demand function; h(.) the Hicksian demand function and 
e(.) the expenditure function. u
0 denotes the utility that the representative consumer 
attains when the provision of public services Y
0 is done efficiently. Equation (6) is 
implied by our simplifying assumption that all of the income, obtained by our 
representative consumer, derives from work effort. In other words, we assume that 
there is no lump sum income, when public services provision is done efficiently. 
 







R = . (7) 
 
In order to raise R
1 the government – in the model – will have to increase taxes. To 
ensure consistency with the measures of welfare change that we will propose to use 
(the Hicksian compensating variation) we must determine the required tax rate, t
1, 
  26using the Hicksian demand function. The level of utility to use will be u
0, exactly the 
level that the representative consumer will attain under efficient provision. 
 
Thus, to wrap up the new required level of taxation will have to satisfy: 
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where R is the tax revenue function as in Diamond and McFadden (1974). Hence, the 
second step, in our procedure, is to determine the tax rate, t
1 that is necessary to 
balance the budget under the relevant degree of inefficiency in public service 
provision. 
 
Figure 4 allows a simple graphical explanation of the loss, in consumption terms, for 
the consumer, associated with inefficiency in public services’ provision. 
 
Figure 4 – Consumer’s loss due to inefficiency in public services’ provision 
 
 
  27In Figure 4 our starting point, E0, satisfies   by construction. If one 
would consider only the increase in taxes from t
0 ) , ) 1 ((
0 0 = + u p t e
0 to t
1, without compensating the 
consumer, welfare would decline to u
1, at point E1. Without compensation, 
expenditure – at the new level of welfare – would remain unchanged: 
. When taxation increases, as required by inefficiency in public 
services’ provision, the consumer must be compensated, in order to be able to attain 
the initial level of utility. When such compensation is paid, the budget constraint 
shifts up, and the corresponding equilibrium is labelled E
0 ) , ) 1 ((
1 1 = + u p t e
2 in Figure 4.  The increase 
in taxation is thus associated with a total loss (as measured by Hicks’ compensating 
variation), in terms of consumption, of OQ, of which OQL is the change in the 
deadweight loss while QLQ is the additional tax revenue.  
 
In other words, in order to quantify (in monetary units) the consumer’s welfare we 
take the level of utility u
0 and ask: how much would it be necessary to pay the 
consumer so that she would be able to reach the initial level of welfare when taxes are 
increased from t
0 to t
1? The answer is given by the compensating variation, CV: 
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where the latter equality makes it clear that the compensating variation measures 
welfare change, in the monetary units, evaluated at the consumer prices prevailing in 
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is our measure of deadweight loss or excess burden. Thus the third and last step in our 
procedure is to compute the compensating variation and the corresponding measure of 
excess burden or deadweight loss. 
 
  284.2. Costs of inefficiency in public services provision 
 
In order to make our procedure operational, it is necessary to make assumptions about 
consumer preferences and constraints. In this subsection we provide some estimates 
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The indirect utility function for the Stone-Geary preferences v(.) is given by  
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By assumption, we have α0 +α1=1. It is easy to show that the Marshallian demand 
functions corresponding to the solution to the above problem, taking into account the 
household budget constraint (3), may be written as:
8
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It is possible to use the Marshallian demand equations to substitute for x and l in the 
utility function obtaining the indirect utility function defined above. The indirect 
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7 See notably Geary (1950-51). 
8 See Appendix A. 
  29Deriving the expenditure function in order of the consumer price q=p(1+t) allows us 
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In our example when public services’ provision is efficient the tax rate is t
0. Since we 
will take that situation as our reference situation we will start out 
with: .  0 ) , 1 ), 1 ( (
0 0 = + U t p e
 
We use this condition to determine the reference utility level, U
0 in (15).  Using this 
same utility level in (16) we obtain the Hicksian or compensated demand function 
corresponding to the financing needs of the public sector under efficiency in the 
provision of public services. 
 
We are now ready to follow the procedure described in section 2. The parameters 
used in the simulation will be either inspired by some facts about the Portuguese 
economy or will be chosen arbitrarily (we will be explicit about all relevant 
assumptions made).  
 
For instance, in Portugal, in 2004, tax revenues (including social security 
contributions) were 37.1 per cent of GDP (see Table 5) or almost 60 per cent of 
private consumption. In Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi, (2005, 2006), efficiency in 
public service provision, in Portugal, is estimated at, respectively, 0.79 and 0.39. We 
use this range to argue that it makes sense to assume that if public service provision 
were efficient in Portugal, taxation in the range of 37.5 per cent of consumption 
would suffice for its financing. Assuming T=168=7×24 (just a normalization of the 
time endowment), α0 =α1=1/2, γ0=98 and γ1=5. Thus, given the conventions adopted, 
efficient provision of the given amount of public services requires 14.625 monetary 
units. Hence, t
0 must equal 0.6 (τ=37.5 per cent). 
 
Let us now quantify what happens when the efficiency in public services’ provision 
deteriorate to the levels estimated by Afonso et al. (2005) for the Portuguese case. 
  30Their estimate of efficiency delivers δ=0.79, which implies that to maintain the level 
of provision an increase of (1/0.79)-1=26.6 per cent is required. If we use the 
alternative estimate in Afonso et al. (2006), given that δ=0.39 the increase required is 
(1/0.39)-1=156.4 per cent. 
 
Using the Hicksian or compensated demand curve for consumption it is easy to see 
that the tax revenue function implies that the tax rate must increase to approximately 
t
1=0.795, in the first case (τ=44.3 per cent). Given that the Hicksian demand function 
is downward slopping the increase in the tax rate required is proportionally greater 
than the required increase in tax revenue. Such effect corresponds to the curvature of 
the Dupuit-Laffer curve. The effect is evidently more pronounced for the higher 
estimate of inefficiency. In this case t
1=1.945 (τ=66.0 per cent). 
 
Using the new tax rate in the expenditure function we may now see that the total loss 
(direct and indirect) borne by the consumer is 4.64 monetary units. The value of the 
loss compares with an increase in tax revenue of 3.89. Given our parameters, taking 
into account indirect costs of inefficiency increases the estimated magnitude of the 
loss by about 20 per cent. In our second case the total loss to the consumer equals a 
much larger 28.8 monetary units, which compares with an increase in tax revenue of 
22.9. The indirect costs, associated with the excess burden, are now 26 per cent. Table 
8 reports the results for alternative values of efficiency in public services provision. 
 
Table 8 – Numerical simulation for alternative efficiency scores 
(t
























1.00 0.600  37.5  0.00  0.00  - 
0.79 0.795  44.3  4.64  3.89  19.3 
0.70 0.921  47.9  7.54  6.27  20.3 
0.65 1.009  50.2  9.53  7.88  21.0 
0.60 1.116  52.7  11.87  9.75  21.8 
0.55 1.245  55.5  14.67  11.97  22.6 
0.50 1.406  58.4  18.07  14.63  23.5 
0.45 1.612  61.7  22.27  17.88  24.6 
0.39 1.945  66.0  28.84  22.88  26.1 
 
  31From Table 8 we can clearly discern the importance of Dupuit-Pigou effects. In fact, 
we may verify Dupuit’s two general principles of taxation at work: first, the revenue 
shortfall associated with inefficiency in the provision of public services demands a 
more than proportional increase in tax rates. In Dupuit’s words “The heavier the tax, 
the less it yields relatively.” Second, the total loss increases significantly faster than 
the tax rate (“The loss of utility increases with the square of the tax.”)  
 
In our example the magnification of the cost of inefficiency in public sector provision 
is always significant and its relative importance increases with the magnitude the 
inefficiency. Specifically, as the efficiency coefficient declines from 0.79 to 0.39, the 
relative importance of indirect costs on total costs increases from 19.3 to 26.1 per 
cent. In general, as the provision of public services and the degree of inefficiency 
increase the more important it becomes to take the indirect costs of provision, through 
distortional taxation, into account. 
 
In order to assess the sensitivity of our numerical simulations, we report in Table 9 an 
alternative case, where the consumer has a higher preference for leisure, with α0=0.6.  
 
Table 9 – Numerical simulation for alternative efficiency scores 
(t
























1.00 0.600  37.5  0.00  0.00  - 
0.79 0.801  44.5  4.01  3.27  22.7 
0.70 0.933  48.3  6.53  5.27  23.9 
0.65 1.025  50.6  8.26  6.62  24.7 
0.60 1.137  53.2  10.29  8.20  25.5 
0.55 1.274  56.0  12.73  10.06  26.5 
0.50 1.446  59.1  15.70  12.30  27.6 
0.45 1.666  62.5  19.37  15.03  28.8 
0.39 2.025  66.9  25.11  19.24  30.5 
 
Under such conditions, the indirect costs, associated with the excess burden, are now 
higher and, for instance, for the case of the lowest efficiency coefficient of 0.39, are 
almost 31 per cent. 
 
  32We report in Table 10 the results for the baseline case using instead γ1=0, which 
imposes in this case both a higher tax burden and higher associated costs (see also 
Appendix B for additional alternative values attributed to the different parameters, 
both with the Stone-Geary function and with a Cobb-Douglas function).  
 
Table 10 – Numerical simulation for alternative efficiency scores 
(t
























1.00 0.600  37.5  0.00  0.00  - 
0.79 0.807  44.7  4.39  3.49  25.9 
0.70 0.945  48.6  7.18  5.63  27.6 
0.65 1.043  51.1  9.10  7.07  28.8 
0.60 1.163  53.8  11.38  8.75  30.1 
0.55 1.311  56.7  14.13  10.74  31.6 
0.50 1.500  60.0  17.50  13.13  33.3 
0.45 1.747  63.6  21.72  16.04  35.4 





In the last four decades there has been a considerable increase in the share of public 
expenditures in GDP. It prolongs the trend that goes back at least to the late 
nineteenth century (see Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000). Such pattern has been 
accompanied by a substantial increase in public sector revenues, especially derived 
from taxation and contributions to social security. The stylised evidence reviewed 
documents these dynamics with a special focus on EU countries.  
 
In this paper revisit the literature on the economic consequences from inefficiency in 
public services provision. The literature finds that, in many countries, inefficiency in 
public services’ provision is considerable. Most authors emphasize the need of 
changing public sector management practices and the scope of activities carried out 
by general government. Following Dupuit (1844) and Pigou (1947) we focus instead 
on the financing side.  
 
The fact that public sector financing must rely on distortional taxation implies that it 
is important to take into account the direct and indirect costs implied by inefficiency 
  33in public services provision. Financing spending through distortional taxation leads to 
a magnification of overall costs due to the operation of two general propositions about 
taxation, already identified by Dupuit (1844). The first states that it is, in general, 
necessary to increase tax rates more than proportionally to the additional revenue 
needed due to inefficiency. The second states that the excess burden or deadweight 
loss associated with taxation increases with the square of the tax rate. Using simple 
numerical examples, using Hicks’ compensating variation (following Diamond and 
McFadden (1974) and Auerbach (1985)), and some public sector inefficiency 
coefficients form the existing literature, we show that these magnification 
mechanisms are not only conceptually relevant, they are also important from a 
quantitative point of view. 
 
Specifically, we rely on a range of estimates of public sector efficiency, for Portugal 
(from Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi, 2005, 2006) to illustrate numerically that the 
relative importance indirect costs of public sector provision inefficiency, linked to 
financing through distortional taxation increases with the magnitude of the 
inefficiency. Given our parameters, for a situation where tax revenues (including 
social security contributions) are around 37 per cent of GDP and almost 60 per cent of 
private consumption, and a use of roughly 27 per cent more resources than the 
minimum required, taking into account indirect costs of inefficiency increases the 
estimated magnitude of the loss due to distortionary taxation by about 20 per cent. 
These results should be interpreted with care and should not be taken to be in any way 
accurate. Nevertheless, they illustrate the potential magnitude of the relevant effects.  
 
Thus, we conclude that taking direct and indirect costs into account is crucial for the 









  34Appendix A – Demand functions 
 
Using the Stone-Geary utility function and the household budget constraint, we can 
write the consumer’s maximization problem 
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x l U Max
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and the corresponding Lagrange function, 
 
  [ ] l T px t x l Z + − + + − − = ) 1 ( ) ( ) (
1 0
1 0 λ γ γ
α α . (A2) 
 
After setting the first partial derivatives to zero,  
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we can multiply both sides of (A3) by (l-γ0), and simplify: 
 








0 − = . (A7) 
 
Similarly, multiply both sides of (A4) by (x-γ1), 
 











γ . (A9) 
 
Substituting (A7) and (A9) in (A5) 
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p t , (A10) 
 
and multiplying (A10) by λ, 
 
  [] U T p t ) ( ) 1 ( 0 1 0 1 α α λ γ γ + = + − +  (A11) 
  [ ] 0 1 ) 1 ( / γ γ λ + − + = T t p U . (A12) 
 
Finally, substituting (A12) back in (A7) and (A9) gives us the Marshallian demand 
functions reported in section 4.2 of the text: 
 
 ) ) 1 ( ( 1 0 0 0 γ γ α γ t p T l + − − + =  (A13) 
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To obtain the indirect utility function substitute the demand equations (A13) and 
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our equation (15) in the text. At last, the Hicksian demand is obtained by computing 























  36Appendix B – Alternative simulations 
 
•  With the Stone-Geary utility function: 
 
Table A1 – Numerical simulation for alternative efficiency scores 
(t
























1.00 0.600  37.5  0.00  0.00  - 
0.79 0.805  44.6  3.31  2.65  24.8 
0.70 0.940  48.5  5.39  4.28  26.1 
0.65 1.035  50.9  6.82  5.37  26.9 
0.60 1.150  53.5  8.50  6.65  27.8 
0.55 1.292  56.4  10.52  8.16  28.9 
0.50 1.469  59.5  12.96  9.98  30.0 
0.45 1.696  62.9  15.99  12.19  31.2 
0.39 2.067  67.4  20.71  15.60  32.7 
 
 
Table A2 – Numerical simulation for alternative efficiency scores 
(t
























1.00 0.600  37.5  0.00  0.00  - 
0.79 0.786  44.0  4.91  4.29  14.5 
0.70 0.905  47.5  7.96  6.91  15.2 
0.65 0.987  49.7  10.04  8.68  15.6 
0.60 1.084  52.0  12.48  10.75  16.1 
0.55 1.202  54.6  15.38  13.19  16.6 
0.50 1.348  57.4  18.89  16.13  17.1 
0.45 1.530  60.5  23.21  19.71  17.7 










  37•  With the Cobb-Douglas utility function,   (now γ
1 0 α α x l U = 0=γ1=0): 
 
Table A3 – Numerical simulation for alternative efficiency scores 
(t
























1.00 0.600  37.5  0.00  0.00  - 
0.79 0.807  44.7  10.55  8.37  25.9 
0.70 0.945  48.6  17.23  13.50  27.6 
0.65 1.043  51.1  21.84  16.96  28.8 
0.60 1.163  53.8  27.32  21.00  30.1 
0.55 1.311  56.7  33.91  25.77  31.6 
0.50 1.500  60.0  42.00  31.50  33.3 
0.45 1.747  63.6  52.13  38.50  35.4 
0.39 2.163  68.4  68.22  49.27  38.5 
 
 
Table A4 – Numerical simulation for alternative efficiency scores 
(t
























1.00 0.600  37.5  0.00  0.00  - 
0.79 0.821  45.1  8.91  6.70  33.1 
0.70 0.972  49.3  14.64  10.80  35.5 
0.65 1.081  51.9  18.61  13.57  37.2 
0.60 1.216  54.9  23.37  16.80  39.1 
0.55 1.387  58.1  29.14  20.62  41.4 
0.50 1.609  61.7  36.30  25.20  44.0 
0.45 1.908  65.6  45.36  30.80  47.3 
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